I TRODUCTIO
NASA continues to take on challenging concepts for missions, in both the robotic and manned realm. This includes the development of commercial resources for providing supplies and services, the developing effort to establish a manned presence on the Martian surface, and in the more immediate future, NASA is pursuing the development of complex systems to explore for life on the Europa moon of Jupiter. Figure 1 shows a conceptual graphic of the Europa Clipper [1] .
Within the context of these challenges the design environment for space systems continues to evolve demanding more flexibility from the Mission Assurance disciplines. With the need for a new R&M Standard, NASA OSMA has developed an approach to provide for flexibility in this emerging environment while focusing on a vision that is rooted in technical objectives rather than specifying specific products and processes. This approach uses the development of objectives hierarchies with supporting strategies for implementation. The results promise the potential of improved effectiveness, flexibility, and compatibility with Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), which is being deployed on the Europa Clipper development as well as Safety Case development for NASA projects in the future. The safety case is envisioned as serving a greater role in safety assurance of NASA projects [2] .
Model Based System Engineering is explored in many references [3, 4] . Essentially, MBSE is emerging over document-centric systems development as the approach to facilitate complex systems design effectively and expediently. It is the vision of NASA's OSMA that the synergy of the objectives-driven approach with MBSE will improve effectiveness through focusing on what is important to attaining a safe and reliable mission and will reduce costs by enabling flexibility. The creativity of the Mission Assurance and Systems Engineering communities will drive success. The timing for a new standard and new approach in R&M was highly appropriate, as new documentation for policy was needed. This is in view of the revision of other key documents, including NPR 7120.5 Space Flight Program and Project Management [5] , which was updated in 2012, and ongoing revisions of the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [6] . Further, R&M at NASA was previously codified in NASA Policy Directive 8720.1 [7] . This document contained 5 key R&M policy statements and expired in 2013, leaving a need for new policy directions. In addition, many of the practical elements of the field, as practiced currently for NASA, were derived from NASA Standard 8729.1 [8] . This document provided guidance to R&M over the lifecycle as well discussing top-level R&M considerations, germane to the agency. However, the document focused on R&M management processes, rather than defining in a structured manner, the technical considerations related to the R&M discipline.
The need for a new and flexible approach to assurance is clear as system engineering shifts gears toward model-based systems engineering and as the assurance fields began to embrace the safety case approach. These new approaches in design and assurance of designs demand that the assurance field take a new look at what R&M efforts and products may look like moving forward. The objectives-based approach provides for this flexibility.
EVOLUTIO OF SYSTEMS DEVELOPME T A D SMA IMPACT

Model-Based Systems Engineering
As stated, part of the motivation for developing a new standard, under an objectives-driven approach, is to provide synergy with emerging systems engineering developments. Systems engineering seeks to find an optimal design for a system, balancing performance, assurance factors, and costs needed to meet customer requirements. Generally, systems engineers execute an iterative process to define architectures for the system in consideration of the lifecycle, including: manufacturing, deployment, operations, maintenance, and end of life. The systems engineer makes decisions about the design and is facilitated by models that aid in defining the functions and interfaces, and as the design emerges; requirements for reliability and safety are naturally under consideration. Quantitative assessments of the reliability and performance are compared against systems requirements through models. A basic view of systems design is reflected in Figure 2 [6, 9] .
In the NASA perspective, systems development is enveloped within key technical management activities Requirements and systems functions are analyzed, the architecture is derived, and validation activities are carried out as the design emerges in the context of product realization. Assurance activities and reliability and safety requirements are a necessary and integral part of the process. In the typical environment the assurance elements of the project are responsible for several products that will result in a document, such as a hazard report or a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA).
In recent years, systems engineering has evolved from producing the system design that is reflected in documents, to systems design processes that are model-centric. The "sysML" language emerged to support the modeling environment. Models that describe the system requirements, functional behavior, and structure reside in the IT framework of the organization and can be displayed in visual formats to the design team. The entire design team works from one model set. The model set facilitates all the activities within Figure 2 ; improving design time, design cost effectiveness and design qualities, which are keys to successful development [10] .
There are many resources to describe the advantages and details of sysML-facilitated MBSE [2, 3, 4] . The details are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to understand how this environment may change Mission Assurance. MBSE offers an unprecedented opportunity to increase the effectiveness of Mission Assurance. This becomes particularly apparent for safety and reliability.
First, requirements are effectively managed within a sysML framework, which may include requirements that are related to all aspects of Mission Assurance. The interaction of requirements with other model elements through requirements traceability can be highly effective to understanding how requirements are satisfied within the system [3] . Second, structural models of the system can integrate all aspects of the system, including hardware and software. Integration of these elements improves effectiveness in understanding of how systems can fail as result of hardware and software interactions and how these may propagate. Next, behavior of the system can be rapidly understood in terms of use-cases, activity models and state machine models that are powerful in assisting with understanding systems faults and failures. The system can be studied in detail and effective model-based failure modes and effects analyses can emerge [11, 14] . Further, parametric models that represent behavior, including performance, can be represented as random variables to allow for understanding the impact of uncertainty, thus allowing for rapid understanding of reliability issues [3] . These types of models can then simulate behavior and generate some understanding of the uncertainties in meeting requirements.
Figure 2 ASA perspective of systems engineering activities
Another advantage is that sysML models can be developed that link typical logic models and analyses that are prevalent in safety and reliability analysis [12, 13] . These models can be linked together and serve as an integral part of trade decisions rather than being conducted as separate activities from the efforts of the systems engineering team. Fault trees can be derived directly from analysis of fault propagation and quantified in rapid fashion within an MBSE framework. FMEAs and hazards and the implications of improvements can be studied in the simulations [15] . Linking of these models to the systems design facilitates effective reliability and safety analysis, as the design changes and is refined. Safety and reliability engineers are more closely linked to the development, as opposed to document-centric approaches. Further, the sysML framework of the system then becomes an ideal environment to build a safety case framework [13] .
The emergence of MBSE demands flexibility from Mission Assurance to move from document-centric approaches that often hinder development of the system to objective-based products that are embedded with, and compatible to, the basic sysML framework. Typical mission assurance products and processes need to change to fit within this framework. The development of an objective hierarchy for reliability and maintainability, as well as other key assurance disciplines, will facilitate flexibility and agility and help to enable this to happen.
Safety and Assurance Cases
With new and increasing challenges, system safety is also evolving. System safety is supported by R & M activities within the scope of the development process, in the form of analysis and models. NASA has recognized that increasing efficiency, flexibility and effectiveness in the safety realm can be achieved with the safety case approach [2, 17] .
NASA's Risk Informed Safety Case (RISC) is "a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, which provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment." Figure 3 
consistent with the desired level of indenture for the system under consideration. As explained, this approach provides for flexibility and improves effectiveness. This is supported by the objectives-driven approach. A wellconceived objectives hierarchy can seed the initiation of the safety case and is a key element to enabling the flexibility that is fundamental to this approach.
Safety cases, or the more general assurance case, have emerged in many industries to support the development of safe and reliable systems. This includes transportation, aeronautics and nuclear industries. Depending upon the complexity of the system, the safety case can become large and needs to be supported by tools and managed in a highly systematic way. Goal Structured Notation (GSN) supports this. GSN, developed at York University, utilizes logic-based structures and symbols to drive the hierarchy that is the substance of the safety or assurance case. A modified version of this was used to develop the R&M objectives hierarchy, as explained in subsequent sections.
MBSE is emerging as a predominate facilitator to systems engineering. Safety case and assurance cases have been demonstrated to be highly compatible with MBSE [16, 21] . Structural and behavioral models that emerge to analyze the system can be used to support the development of the assurance case. This affords significant flexibility and agility in defining the assurance of the system during the design and analysis of the system.
OBJECTIVES-BASED APPROACH: FOCUS A D FLEXIBILITY
Goal Structure otation for the R&M Hierarchy
The objectives hierarchy forming the basis of NASAs new standard was developed using a modified version of Goal Structure Notation (GSN. GSN was used to structure defined objectives and sub-objectives, while mapping them with strategies that are used to accomplish the various objectives. A top-level objective was defined for R&M and sub-objectives
Figure 4 Illustration of Risk-Informed Safety Case Hierarchy in which a claim about the safety of a system must be supported by evidence
Objec ve: System remains func onal for intended life me, environment, opera ng condi ons and usage Strategy: Assess quan ta ve reliability measures and recommend or support changes to system design and/or opera ons Strategy: Understand failure mechanisms, eliminate and/or control failure causes, degrada on and common cause failures, and limit failure propaga on to reduce likelihood of failure to an acceptable level
Figure 3 Implementation of modified GS
elaborate on that objective in hierarchal fashion. Each objective block is coupled with at least one strategy that is used to facilitate accomplishment of the objective. A benefit to this method is that it clearly separates objectives from the actions that may be employed to satisfy them. The modified GSN was primarily made up of the aforementioned "Objectives" and "Strategies" as illustrated in Figure 4 . In the use of GSN for the purposes of this standard development, the team has stuck to using these two essential blocks in an alternating fashion; i.e. each objective is coupled with at least one strategy and then each sub objective of that pair is coupled with at least one strategy. In addition to these two primary blocks, the notation used herein includes another block, the "Context" block, which is used solely as a descriptive tag to Objective or Strategy blocks. These will be used purely to define context elements of a primary block. These block types are shown in Figure 5 .
This modified GSN approach was adopted and implemented in a team environment. The team represented a significant cross section of the R & M expertise within NASA.
Formulating the Objectives-Based Approach: Focus and Flexibility
The fundamental tenet of the objectives-driven approach is to define the technical objectives and strategies that constitute the R&M considerations for a system, as derived from a top-level objective. These 'R&M considerations' that are represented in the objectives-driven approach represent one subset of the broader set of objectives and accomplishments required to successfully and safely complete spaceflight projects. This is in contrast to the current processbased approach, which describes the R&M activities in terms of specific processes, techniques, and deliverables.
As an example, process-based requirements might mandate that a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) be performed on all systems. While FMEA is certainly a very valuable process for assessing a system, simply mandating that one be performed does not reveal the overall objective that is sought by performing one. However, if one states a requirement, in terms of an objective, such as '…ensure that the system is tolerant to faults, failures, and other anomalous events' then the engineer is put in the mindset of satisfying that objective. This allows for the use of other methodologies in place of FMEA (if desired), and more directly and efficiently addresses the R&M concern creating flexibility and compatibility with the advancing design and assurance environment.
The objectives-driven approach starts with a single toplevel objective, which is then broken down into sub-objectives much like the development of a hierarchal safety case. Integral to this structure, however, is the use of Strategies to convey information about satisfying objectives. An objective is simply a goal of a successful R&M project. The strategy or strategies that couple with it identify non-process specific methodologies for satisfying the objective. Consider the following example shown in Figure 6 that shows an objective and its coupled strategy; this example follows along the lines of the previous example.
Note that in this example the objective is clearly stated, as are the technical means to show that it has been satisfied, yet a process requirement has not been given. The end result of employing this type of approach is a situation that gives more meaning to a claim that R&M objectives were met, rather than one which shows simply that all products were completed.
The objectives-driven approach used for construction of this standard is in part due to the inherent limitations of process-based Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) planning. The process-based approach, as it is defined by process, is ultimately a bottom up approach with a focus on the end-item products that are used to satisfy R&M considerations. Doing so results in a failure to view R&M activities in the frame of satisfying technical objectives.
One way to characterize SMA objectives is to identify risks present from known and unknown threats, and ensure that these risks are as low as reasonably practicable. Figure 7 , shows an example of design risks that one may use to assist in Figure 6 Modified GS with context block Objec ve: System is tolerant to faults, failures and other anomalous internal and external events Strategy: Assure that system includes necessary barriers and mi ga ons to keep anomalous events from compromising the ability to meet mission objec ves Figure 5 An objective coupled to a strategy developing top-level objectives that ensure low risk during both development and implementation phases of the mission lifecycle. Following this, sub-objectives can be written beneath each top-level objective to cover individual threats. All of these are objectives necessary for ensuring Safety and Mission Success. The proposal for the R&M Standard content is to apply this type of approach for the R&M disciplines of hardware reliability, functional dependability, and maintainability.
The ASA R&M Hierarchy: The Top Level
The top-level R&M objective is defined simply as: Top Objective: System performs as required over the lifecycle to satisfy mission objectives From this objective a single strategy is identified to obtain the desired results. This strategy describes several tactics while will form the four sub-objective branches of the R&M objectives structure. That strategy is as follows:
Top-Strategy: Prevent faults and failures, and provide mitigation capabilities as needed to maintain an acceptable level of functionality considering safety, performance, and sustainability objectives
The objective hierarchy as a basis for a standard in R&M affords flexibility, focusing the design and assurance teams on the important technical objectives needed to achieve a reliable product, as opposed to exercising a process and producing an R&M artifact or product. This will enable the R&M community to readily adapt to the changing environment, which promises increased efficiency, reduced design time, and improved effectiveness. 
